

E S S A Y S,

M O R A L,

R E L I G I O U S,

A N D

MISCELLANEOUS.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

A PROSE TRANSLATION

OF MR. BROWNE'S LATIN POEM,

De Animi Immortalitate.

By J. H.

V O L. II.

L O N D O N,

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MDCCLXVI.



M. O. R.
CONTENTS of Vol. II.
R. E. L. G. I. O. U. S.
Page 1

On the origin of the
Constitution of the
United States
and the
rights of the
people.



On the
rights of the
people
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Constitution
of the
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CONTENTS of Vol. II.

On Benevolence	Page 1
On Reputation	7
Consciousness of Merit consistent with Modesty	15
Considerations on a Letter relating to the Conduct of Lewis XIV. and other Persecutors, whom the Letter-writer supposes inexcusa- bly guilty	19
Some cursory Remarks on Dr. Brown's Essays on the Character- istics of Lord Shaftesbury	27
On Mr. Hume's Idea of Liberty and Necessity	40
On Politeness and Complaisance, as contradistinguished	44
On	

C O N T E N T S.

On Parental Authority	55
Part of a Speech designed for Titus, just when the Correspondence between him and Lucia was discovered	72
Remarks occasioned by some Letters relating to Œdipus and Clarissa	79
Whether Artists only are proper Judges of the Works of Art	84
On Lawyers and Clients	91
On the present Method of Tryal by Juries	95
Translation of Mr. Browne's Poem De Animi Immortalitate	109


RELI-



RELIGIOUS, MORAL,

AND

CRITICAL ESSAYS.



ON BENEVOLENCE.

NO man is perfectly virtuous, or perfectly vicious. He whose general course of action is virtuous, though he may in some instances deviate, is denominated a virtuous man, and *vice versa*: so with respect to benevolence and malevolence; he in whom the former is the principle, or motive

VOL. II.

B

from

from which he more generally acts, may be styled a benevolent man : and that there is such a principle in the human mind, is evident from numberless instances ; as when we are excited to charity, by compassion for the misfortunes and distresses of our fellow-creatures, without the consideration of any possible advantage to ourselves ; the disposition we feel to assist other animals in misery, who can make no return, nor are sensible of the obligation ; the tenderness for children, not only in parents, but in strangers ; and though that of the former should be distinguished by the term *instinct*, it is not therefore the less natural ; for it is supposed, that benevolence is implanted in us by the God of nature, as a principle of action. Hence the pain we feel, on the mere
relation

relation of the sufferings of others, who have no connection with us, who are utterly unknown to us, in past ages and distant countries, and the ardent wishes to relieve, even where it is not in our power; the detestation of cruelty, which we properly call *inhumanity*, and the approbation of kind and beneficent actions. If it be pretended, that
 “ this however centers all in self; that
 “ we are so made as to be subject to
 “ these sensations; and that therefore
 “ in relieving the distressed, we only
 “ remove our own personal uneasiness,
 “ or in wishing it, only wish to do so;
 “ that we gratify ourselves by making
 “ others happy:”—be it so,—this is the very thing contended for; and the true difference between a benevolent and a malevolent being consists plainly

in this, that the former cannot be happy alone, while he sees others miserable about him, and therefore assists and relieves them if he can ; and if he cannot, wishes to do so, and by sympathy suffers with those who suffer ; whereas the happiness of the latter (if such there be) centers in himself alone, without regard to others, without being uneasy at their calamities, or pleased with their enjoyments, this being properly *selfish* in the bad sense of that word. Surely these two characters are very different ; but though no one is perfect in either, yet there is apparently a more and a less, and the predominant disposition denominates the character, as was said, of the virtuous and vicious in general.

Neither

Neither does perfect benevolence in the Deity necessarily exclude *self*, if it be allowed, for illustration, to use that term, in a sense no way derogatory from his infinite perfections. For is not he himself said to be delighted in doing good, in communicating happiness? And if (as is commonly supposed) he is perfectly free, then he could communicate misery as easily as happiness, had he chosen it; to say, he *could* not, is to say he is not free; but that he *will* not, is owing to his goodness, or benevolence.

If this slight representation be not, so far as it goes, a fair account of the matter, what different qualities are essential to true benevolence? and particularly, can it be thought an essen-

tial, that the mind should feel neither pleasure nor pain, on account of the happiness or misery of others? Such an apathy seems inconsistent even with the definition of that malevolence ascribed by some to human nature; for it is asserted, that men have pleasure in giving pain. Must it not follow then, that the contrary is benevolence? that if he who rejoices in tormenting is malevolent, he who rejoices in communicating happiness is benevolent? And as the malevolent is the more hateful and diabolical, the more he delights in the misery of others; so the benevolent is the more amiable and god-like, the more he delights in the happiness of others.

On

ON REPUTATION.

FAME, glory, or reputation, seems to be the strongest of all principles, and to have greater force in the human mind, than even virtue or religion, since these are often sacrificed to it; as in the case of a duellist, especially the challenged, who, on that sole motive, acts against his own notions of virtue, and generally against his own professed religion; which if he truly believes (as no doubt most do) he risks eternal happiness, for a temporary fame; and if he does not believe the religion he professes, yet that very profession is made for reputation, which proves the position, though the reputation of being a religious man is given up for what.

is evidently, in the case under consideration, esteemed a glory still preferable.

The case of women murdering their illegitimate off-spring is still stronger, inasmuch as very few, if any, of them, have the least doubt of the commonly received notions of religion, or of the heinousness of the crime they are prompted to commit; and it is manifest, that the fear of infamy, or (which is the same thing) a regard for their reputation, is the only motive in many, and the strongest in most, to such crimes, from which the prospect of damnation has not force enough to deter them; so superlatively strong is this principle! and when Cicero says, "Ask Brutus, &c. what they had in view, and what they proposed to themselves,

“ themselves, in endeavouring to pro-
 “ cure liberty to their country; and
 “ what induced Mutius Scævola to
 “ attempt the death of Porfenna; what
 “ inspired Cocles with so much cou-
 “ rage, to oppose singly a whole
 “ army on the bridge; what induced
 “ Lucretia rather to suffer the crime
 “ of adultery, than the shame of it;
 “ with many other heroic actions, that
 “ might be mentioned; the answer is,
 “ *Glory.*”—And that principle has been
 sufficient to enable men to undergo
 the greatest tortures without flinching,
 or discovering the least sign of weak-
 ness; as among the Americans, and
 elsewhere: and also to undertake and
 perpetrate the wickedest actions, as
 some of Alexander, and other conque-
 rors. Both Cæsar and Pompey, for
 ambition,

ambition, ventured the destruction of their own country and fellow-citizens: the conspiracies of Sylla, Cinna, Marius, Catiline, &c. and often the suppression of them, had the same motives; even Cicero himself seems to have been as much actuated by this principle, as by the love of his country.

And what is that love of their country, so much inculcated and praised among the Romans, but an unjust and inequitable distinction, for the sake of glory, which rendered them cruel to their neighbours, and tyrants to all whom they conquered? By no means, a generous, humane principle!

There are so many instances of the wickedest actions (though they are called *great*, on account of the courage necessary to undertake and perform them)

them) for which no other motive can be assigned, that it is evidently of itself sufficient to enable a man to undertake any enterprize, that ever has been, or can be, proposed. This has been the source of the greatest, as well as sometimes of the meanest, actions; as of him who burned Diana's temple for fame; and therefore we cannot conclude, that even the best of men had any other, from the mere actions themselves, or the resolution necessary to perform them; but must examine the circumstances attending these actions, or the general character of the actors, in order to determine whether any other principles or motives (more worthy and of a better kind) concurred with this grand principle; which, though alone sufficient, may be,
and

and (it is hoped) often is, accompanied with others more laudable. However, this so strong and universal is itself noble and praise-worthy, when not productive of wickedness and mischief, but of goodness and benefit to mankind, nor is it to be depreciated, but directed.

Since then this has been, and is, a sufficient motive, for actions esteemed the best, as well as for those esteemed the worst, that have ever been performed by men; and since it is also sufficient to restrain people from crimes, which, notwithstanding any other principles, they would commit (as appears, by their committing still greater, to conceal the less); it is no want of charity, but a wise conduct, to examine into the concomitant circumstances

stances of actions, and the characters of the actors, that we may not be deceived in the judgments we form of both.

And legislators would do well to consider, whether this principle may not be made subservient to great and useful purposes in the compiling of laws, and particularly in the nature of those rewards and punishments to be proposed. Indeed, many wise institutions have been framed by ancient lawgivers, which (without any other support) have been effectual, in exciting men to the most arduous undertakings; for instance, in what high estimation has been a crown of mere leaves! and what difficulties have been encountered, and dangers despised, in

order to obtain it! In short, the
 hope of praise and the dread of shame
 have wrought wonders in all times and
 in all nations, in persons of all ages and
 of both sexes.

CONSCIOUSNESS

CONSCIOUSNESS of MERIT con-
sistent with MODESTY.

HE that supposes a thing unat-
tainable, will never attain it;
because he has no motive to use means.
He that supposes what is called a *je ne
sçay quoi* in any thing, will never un-
derstand that thing; because he is al-
ready satisfied, that it is inexplicable.
I suppose every truly great man, in
every way, to aim at, and even to hope
to attain, some degree of perfection, in
that which he pursues. He that is
sure he shall not, it is plain, never will;
and whoever has succeeded, not only
expected it, but used the means ap-
pearing to him most probable for
that

that purpose ; keeping the end still in view.

Those who see, or fancy they see, something like magic in human productions, confess they know not by what means these are effected, and consequently are not capable to produce the like.

If *Raphael*, &c. had ever bestowed any thought about many of those things, which are imputed to them as excellences, it would have been impossible they should have deserved the admiration which is their due ; not only because the mind of man can never take in so many little circumstances, but because it is incompatible with a great genius to descend to them ; nor is it of any importance, whether certain minute circumstances are determined in this
or

or that manner; and he who thinks otherwise, is incapable of great things.

If it should be objected, “ that this
“ hope or expectation of success dis-
“ covers much vanity,” it is replied,
that the objection supposes it impossible
to be a great man, and modest at the
same time; which is contrary to a
thousand facts: but besides, modesty
does not consist in a man’s thinking
more meanly of himself than he de-
serves (that is rather ignorance); but it
consists in being content, that others
should think less of him than he de-
serves, at least till some proper occasion.

He that thinks justly of himself, will
no more suppose he has already suc-
ceeded before he has, than that it is
impossible to succeed. He is modest,
who is content with his due, who does

not think more highly of himself than he deserves, nor takes improper or offensive methods to extort that which is his due; and often quietly sits down without it. 'Tis no part of modesty, not to know one's merit.

A man may have the highest merit, may know it, and be a most amiable and modest man at the same time.

CONSIDER

CONSIDERATIONS ON A LETTER, relating to the CONDUCT of LEWIS XIV, and other PERSECUTORS, whom the LETTER-WRITER supposes inexcusably guilty.

TO render any action criminal, the agent, before he acts, must know it to be so, and have power to forbear it; that is, he must have light or knowlege enough to discern between moral good and moral evil; and he must be endued with liberty of the will, by virtue of which he can chuse the one or the other; and then perversely prefer evil, knowing it to be such. For if he has not light or knowlege, or the means to acquire them,

sufficient to distinguish between moral good and evil, he may mistake evil for good, and, with the best intention, do wrong; in which case he is blameless at least, and may be commendable.

And if he has not liberty of will, he may see what is good and evil, and may be impelled by motives, which (according to this supposition) he cannot resist, to do what he knows to be wrong; in which case, he is also blameless.

Therefore, there must be knowledge and freedom in the agent, to enable him to act morally at all; that is, to render him accountable.

As to the freedom of the will, that is not here the subject of dispute. The only disputed question is, whether every man

man in the world has sufficient light to enable him to discern between moral good and evil in all cases? For he can only be accountable for his intentions, and not for his actions in those instances wherein he has not, or cannot acquire, sufficient knowledge to distinguish.

Now it is certain, that the wisest and most enlightened are ignorant, or doubtful, or liable to mistake, in many cases, even after the most painful and accurate search, and after great solicitude to know and act right. How much more ignorant still must others be, who have meaner parts, less knowledge, and fewer opportunities of acquiring it, and in darker ages or countries! It cannot therefore be a groundless supposition, that some such may

want the light necessary to enable them to discern between what is right, and what is wrong, in many, at least in some, cases; and if in any, that is all the argument requires.

How is it possible to suppose, that all men, in all ages and countries, under all governments, under the influences of all religions, superstitions, customs, and prejudices of every kind, should think alike with respect to moral truths? and if not alike, some must be wrong.

And since every reasoning man must allow, that there is a more and a less in the case, and consequently a most and least, and since the capacities of men differ so very much, by their situation in life, their means of knowledge, and other circumstances; it will not be unreasonable

reasonable to conclude, that some must needs be often and greatly mistaken.

Persecution itself may be very naturally accounted for, if once it be admitted that certain heresies are damnable, or believed to be so; and the tenderest parent, as well as the kindest friend, would, on such a full persuasion, use all means that might be supposed to influence, in order to work a change: and hence, after arguments, even temporal motives, and some degrees of cruelty have been frequently (how unreasonably soever) applied for this purpose, not only for the sake of the persons immediately thus treated, but in hopes also of reclaiming, preventing or discouraging others: and though these methods are improper and ineffectual,

yet, no doubt, very good men have been prompted to them, from the consideration of the danger to these erroneous persons, of continuing in such opinions, which must end in their eternal misery: and if it be considered, that temporal motives have very great influence, in respect to the opinions embraced by mankind; and even sometimes with honest minds, who do not always perceive how great a share these have in determining them, it will be less wonderful if such motives should be added to mere rational arguments; that nothing might be left unattempted, in order to persuade those who are supposed to be so fatally mistaken. Thus may the beginnings of persecution be probably founded in the best and most laudable intention.

Either

Either Cranmer, or some one of the Martyrs of his time, when he remonstrated against the persecution of himself and brethren, being reproached that even he had caused a certain woman to be burned answered only, "Yea, but she was truly a heretic," consistently with the above reasoning. And St. Paul says (Acts xxii. 3, 4.)

I was zealous towards God, as ye all are this day, and I persecuted this way unto the death, binding and delivering into prison, both men and women; notwithstanding which he says (xxiii. 1.) I have lived in all good conscience before God, until this day. (xxvi. 9.) I verily thought with myself, that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth; being exceedingly mad against them. (1 Tim. i. 13.) Who was before a blasphemer

a blasphemer and a persecutor, and injurious; but I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly.

This must necessarily be the case of an imperfect creature. So that the mere goodness or evil of actions cannot always be the test of virtuous or vicious intentions, which alone characterise the heart, and by which every one shall be judged. And it cannot be true, that all men (however circumstanced) have it in their power, in all instances, to perceive what is morally right; and yet nothing short of this can be sufficient for the conclusion drawn.

Some

Some cursory REMARKS on DR.
BROWN'S ESSAYS on the CHA-
RACTERISTICS OF LORD
SHAFTESBURY.

IT appears from this writer's utmost endeavours to discredit ridicule as a test (See p. 54, 55, 56, &c.) that he has been able only to shew, that what is made to appear ridiculous, by the application of it, is neither truth nor virtue; but only the peculiar dress or disguise, that is thrown over them. This, therefore, may surely be removed and shewn to be no real part of the thing pretended to be ridiculed, which remains all the time untouched; and may be made to appear not subject to it: and this is the business of reason, which

which is therefore the test of ridicule ;
 for by this we are enabled to examine,
 whether it be just or not.

Thus he says, " How easy is it to
 " disguise them ! it is but concealing,
 " varying, or adding a circumstance
 " that may strike the fancy ; and they
 " at once assume new shapes, new
 " names and natures. Thus the vir-
 " tues, which, seen in a direct light,
 " attract our admiration by their
 " beauty, when beheld through the
 " oblique medium of ridicule, start
 " up in the forms of idiots, hags,
 " and monsters."

There is false ridicule, as well as
 false reasoning ; but the true both will
 and ought to have their genuine
 effects.

What

What do the soberest reasoners mean, by reducing their antagonists arguments *ad absurdum*, &c. but to shew the ridiculousness of them? And indeed some kind of ridicule will always necessarily be made to lie where the antagonist is fairly baffled; nor do the gravest writers, on the gravest subjects, disdain or avoid it: not even this author in opposing it.

What he says of our comedies, (p. 63.) is very just, and the indignation he shows on the occasion is highly laudable; but by no means proves his point, viz. that ridicule is an improper test of truth, for here the ridicule is false, and easily shewn to be so; and is acknowledged to be detestable: but what then? This is no more justified, than unfair reasoning. And the true is no
more

more to be discouraged, than true reasoning. Besides, it often happens, that placing absurdities in a just point of light does more effectually convince, than sober deduction. Nor do the sacred writers themselves, on the most serious subjects, scruple to make use of it: as in the case between the worshippers of the true God, and the Prophets of Baal: *Cry aloud; for he is a God; either he is talking, or he is pursuing, or he is in a journey, or per-adventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked* *.

At p. 86, and before, and farther on is all ridicule employed by the author himself, while he is declaiming against the use of it.

He says, p. 93, " By this means we shall often view objects of *real* dignity

* 1 Kings, xviii, 27.

" and

"and excellence in such shapes and
 "colours, as are *foreign* to their na-
 "ture, and then sit down and laugh
 "most profoundly at the phantoms of
 "our own creating." What then?
 Why then they are these phantoms,
 that are laughed at; and not the
 objects of dignity, which remain still
 in their native excellence, after we have
 done laughing; and who or what is
 exposed by this means, but our own
 folly? For, as Lord Shaftesbury asks,
 "what ridicule can lie against rea-
 "son?"

P. 94. What he says of Aristopha-
 nes is very proper; but then it only
 proves, that false ridicule may be mis-
 chievous in its effects, and false reason-
 ing is often attended with as bad to the
 full; which however will no more dis-

credit true ridicule rightly applied,
than true reasoning rightly applied.

P. 130, &c. He says very justly, that
 “ aiming at the production of human
 “ happiness, is the great universal foun-
 “ tain, whence our actions derive their
 “ moral beauty; and a conformity to
 “ this end is the very essence of moral
 “ rectitude; and hence therefore, we
 “ may obtain a just and adequate defi-
 “ nition of virtue; which is no other
 “ than a conformity of our affections
 “ with the public good; or the vo-
 “ luntary production of the greatest
 “ happiness.”

P. 144. That some actions are
 esteemed virtuous in one age or coun-
 try, and vicious in another, &c. does
 not alter the nature of virtue; for
 besides,

besides, that most * actions deemed virtuous or vicious are so deemed and distinguished in all ages and countries; it may be affirmed that some others, reckoned vicious in one, are really not so in another, wherein they are not so reckoned: for instance, polygamy, and even concubinage, were not vicious in the early ages of the world, nor in Turkey, and other countries, at present; for the reason assigned above, viz. that the public happiness is no way

* Incest, to which some nations have so great an abhorrence, is esteemed honourable in others, and enjoined in some; as among the Incas in Peru, and the Magi in Persia, and is not naturally immoral; nor produces any mischief where allowed. It was not only lawful, but absolutely necessary at the beginning of the world, and was never unlawful or forbidden, till it became politically so, therefore cannot be naturally immoral.

hurt, where this liberty is deemed lawful.

P. 149. The author is not at all sparing in ridicule against Dr. Mandeville. Indeed, it is a weapon, in the use of which he seems very ready; nor is he to blame in using, but in abusing and decrying it, at the same time that he finds it so expedient for his own purpose. He has justly and properly exposed the weakness and folly, and perhaps wickedness, of some writers, if they really saw the tendency of their principles.

P. 159. He determines, that the true ground of our obligation to the practice of virtue, is private happiness: and that, as the essence of virtue consists in a conformity of our affections and actions with the public happiness,

to it will appear, that the only reason, or motive, by which individuals can possibly be induced, or obliged to the practice of virtue, must be the feeling immediate, or the prospect of future, private happiness. What he says on this subject, appears just and conclusive.

P. 163. He says, “ therefore setting
“ aside, as much as may be, all ambi-
“ guous expressions, it seems evident,
“ that a motive, from its very nature,
“ must be something that affects our
“ self.”

“ If any man hath found out a
“ kind of motive, which doth not
“ affect himself, he hath made a dee-
“ per investigation into the springs,
“ weights, and balances of the human
“ heart, than I can pretend to. Now

“ what can possibly affect ourself, or
 “ determine us to action; but either
 “ the feeling, or prospect, of pleasure
 “ or pain, happiness or misery ?” —

And what immediately follows, seems
 clear and full to the purpose.

His arguments, taken from the con-
 sideration of the different complec-
 tions and temperaments of mankind,
 by which he would prove, that some
 have not (from their make) such dis-
 positions, as would render them more
 happy in a course of virtue, than in
 that of vice, appear altogether incon-
 clusive. His very words are, “ Con-
 “ cerning some tempers, how can we
 “ affirm with truth, that there is a na-
 “ tural motive to virtue? On the con-
 “ trary, it should seem, that if there
 “ be

“ be any motive, it must be to vice,
 “ &c.”

Now it is not to be conceived, from the general make of man, and his situation in this world (whatever his particular temperament may be), that any course can produce to him so much happiness as that of virtue; or that it is possible, by any other means, so effectually to gratify the natural desires, and avoid the natural aversions, common to all men. Some appetites may be stronger in one, and some in another, and so of aversions or fears; and therefore different virtues, more or less cultivated by one than another, but vice (as such) can never be necessary to the happiness of any: and indeed it would reflect on the Creator, if this were true. The contrary is

evident, from the frame both of the human body and mind.

It is indeed very extraordinary, that this writer should say, (p. 186.)

“ Among all this infinite variety of
 “ tempers, we see there cannot be
 “ any uniform motive or obligation
 “ to virtue, save only where, &c. for
 “ in every other character where the
 “ senses &c.—must destroy the uni-
 “ form motive to virtue, by throwing
 “ the happiness of the agent, into an-
 “ other channel.”

What is this but making virtue depend upon temperament, with regard to which no man is free, and excusing vice from mere constitution? One might, with the greatest ease, answer every paragraph of this second part, and shew the virtues in the cultivation of which

which each disposition would find its peculiar happiness, and more so than by indulging in any vices; for (as was said above) different tempers only point out different virtues, but none would be happier in the indulgence of vice. If they could, it would (to talk a little nonsense) be virtuous in them to be vicious; for (according to this author himself) a view to happiness is, ought to be, and only can be, the motive of every individual to the practice of virtue.

However, the beginning of the second part, where he treats of the nature and essence of virtue, and afterwards of the true ground, motive, or obligation of mankind to practise it, seems perfectly true, and is an excellent discourse on the subject.

ON MR. HUME'S IDEA OF LIBERTY
AND NECESSITY.

THIS author, in his third essay
(printed at Edinburgh, 1751)
beginning at p. 151, maintains absolute
uncontroulable necessity, in the
moral as well as the natural world;
but, at the same time, allows an uni-
versal feeling of liberty, and free agency
in man; and asserts, " that philoso-
" phers who have discovered the truth
" of this (as well as the vulgar who
" have not) act constantly upon this
" feeling of liberty, &c. though they
" are convinced, that it is delusive and
" deceitful." He seems a very acute,
and a fair ingenuous writer, not eva-
ding any plausible objections to either
part

part of his system, though perhaps he will not generally be thought to have answered them satisfactorily. And, indeed, it does seem impossible to reconcile truth and falshood in the same mind, perceiving both; it is utterly inconsistent and unaccountable, that a man should blame himself, and feel remorse, for having done what he is sure, he could no more have avoided doing, than he could prevent the beating of his pulse in a fever. Surely, he must, in these instances (which occasion his remorse), either believe himself free, or at least doubt of his being necessary, otherwise he could only feel grief or sorrow, in which the idea of self-blame is not included, as it is in remorse. Unless he will assert, that the vulgar only feel remorse, but that he,

and

and his philosophers, never do. Besides, on his scheme, virtue appears founded on fallacy, and truth and good seem incompatible; as if the Deity was reduced to the expedient of deceit, in order to establish morality among mankind. For if it be really true, that we are absolutely necessary in all our actions, why should God implant or impose this universal feeling of freedom, but that it is presumed, we should not otherwise think ourselves accountable?

Surely, either man is free, feels and knows himself to be so, and thence arises remorse or self-blame, on his having acted against his judgment and conscience;—Or, he is absolutely necessary, finds and knows himself to be so; and therefore, cannot consistently blame himself,

himself, or suffer remorse, for any past action ;—Or, lastly, it is matter of doubt with him, whether he is free or not; in which state of mind, he cannot be wholly without anxiety, nor perhaps without some kind or degree of remorse. And one of these three must be the case of every man.

On

above-mentioned, for which time is to be redeemed. But to sacrifice it to the

On POLITENESS and COMPLAISANCE, as contradistinguished.

IT behoves every one to employ properly, that is, wisely and usefully, the time that is allotted him. In this view, two points are principally to be considered, duty and enjoyment; whatsoever part is otherwise employed, may be justly said to be mis-spent.—And it is the interest of a wise man, not to suffer himself to be disappointed, or interrupted in the pursuit of the one or the other, by those who cannot contribute to either: especially if they are such as neither need, nor demand his good offices; for in such cases, a proper regard and attention will become a duty; this indeed, is one of the points above-

above-mentioned, for which time is to be redeemed. But to sacrifice it to the idle and impertinent, who have no business, no views, no pretence or claim to his indulgence, who, perhaps, are not capable of being benefited by it; and often to the exclusion of such who are, and who also may have claims upon him, is as unjustifiable in him, as unwarrantable in them. Whatever our judgment, on mature deliberation, concludes to be right, we ought, at all hazards, to pursue, and no inferior considerations should prevail against that; if they at any time do, remorse and uneasy sensations will convince us of our error. And it is absurd and inexcusable to pretend, that we see how we ought to act, but want the power or the means; for there can be no obligation.

gation, where the power and means are wanting; but to him who wants fortitude, all the other virtues will be useless.

Among the obstacles that impede, in the prosecution of the most worthy and laudable purposes, there is hardly any of which a good man has more reason to complain, than that of general complaisance; because the occasions for exercising it are frequent, and some of them may consume much time: now, though benevolence is a most amiable natural quality, and politeness an excellent artificial accomplishment, of which the one is essential to a good mind, and the other to a well-bred man; and both absolutely necessary, to extend a man's influence in the world; yet he may possess and
 exercise

exercise both these, in all the instances wherein they can be useful, without subjecting himself to the tyranny of unlimited complaisance, which is so far from being necessarily included in these, that it often interferes with them, and sometimes unseasonably wears out an opportunity not to be recovered.

The term Benevolence is so universally understood, as to need no definition, but it may not be amiss to distinguish between politeness, and complaisance; these will perhaps be thought nearly synonymous, or at least in some cases equivocal, which if granted, they will nevertheless, in other instances, admit of such distinction, as to afford a sufficient foundation for the reflections, herein proposed; and in general, politeness may be considered as a habit of
saying

saying and doing obliging things, or
 an apparent endeavour to give pleasure,
 and to avoid giving pain; with a par-
 ticular attention to the taste and incli-
 nation of others, in which the manner
 is as significant as the matter, and will
 be as visible in little circumstances as
 in greater; but does not necessarily in-
 clude in it an indiscriminate subjection
 to the caprice of all, who may without
 reasonable ground expect it, or an un-
 limited deference even to such who
 may have just pretensions to a proper
 regard; for in this, as in all other cases,
 there must be bounds, otherwise one
 virtue would exclude all the rest; as the
 unrestrained exercise of mercy and cha-
 rity would disable a man from render-
 ing justice where it is due; and so of
 any other the most laudable quality;
 these

these should in certain proportions balance each other; and this is wisdom or prudence, which, like the helm to a ship, should govern and direct all; and without which, there could be no more dependence on any man's moral conduct, than on the course of a vessel without a rudder. By general complaisance, as contradistinguished from politeness, may be understood an unreasonable yielding up ourselves, our inclinations, and our time, to those who have no just pretensions to such sacrifices; and especially when this may interfere with appointments, with measures already calculated for other purposes, with better pursuits, or with some occasion which presents, and may be lost by delay; or if only that time is wasted, which might

be more beneficially or more agreeably employed. This is an evil, which it becomes necessary to oppose, and which unless opposed with firmness and resolution, the best designs will often be irremediably frustrated, the wisest purposes remain unaccomplished; and a man can never be secure from invasion and interruption, in the prosecution of the worthiest and best concerted schemes.—He ought therefore, and if he ought, he justifiably may break through, and disentangle himself from these impediments. And this is to be effected, consistently with all the politeness that is due to mankind by, representing the necessary obligation of a previous engagement, of finishing a design, for which, either the time is limited, or which cannot be resumed,

if

if now interrupted, without disconcerting the whole; or whatever other case or situation can, with truth, be alledged as a reasonable cause for dispensing with ceremonious and customary complaisance. It is evident, that if such liberty be not allowed, the greatest part of life may be spent in idle and frivolous visits and intercourses, to which unfortunately those are most exposed, who ought least to be so beset; that is, those whose conspicuous merit attracts these impertinent intruders; who aim at rendering themselves considerable, by a forced intimacy with distinguished characters. Again; politeness, like modesty, is voluntary, and therefore a virtue; for the modest man chuses to restrain himself when he could shine, and wants not the proper assurance to

exert his talents, but suppresses them
 as unreasonable on certain occasions ;
 whereas complaisance, like bashful-
 ness, is an involuntary restraint, and
 therefore a weakness, at least, if not
 a vice ; for the bashful man would
 willingly exert himself, but wants the
 proper assurance ; even when convinced
 of the propriety and expedience of so
 doing. In short, whether these terms
 are properly defined and explained, or
 not, the things intended by them, it
 is presumed, are sufficiently distinguished
 to admit of no mistake. And all that
 is designed is, to show that polite-
 ness, in the sense here exhibited, is to
 be industriously cultivated, as condu-
 cive to the liberty, ease, pleasure, and
 mutual satisfaction of society. And
 that such complaisance as is here de-
 scribed,

scribed, is, on the contrary, to be banished, as destructive of these benefits and advantages. And as it is true, that the best friend a man has, may, at certain times, be as unseasonable as the most indifferent person; so all whom we find ourselves obliged, occasionally, to dismiss, are to be treated in such manner, as to convince them of the necessity we are then under of using that liberty; and which the nature of the case must warrant, even with those for whom we have the greatest regard and esteem; the person so dismissed will then remain satisfied in himself, and with us, for in this consists the essence of politeness.— And if this liberty may be taken, under certain circumstances, with our best friends,

friends, others may, without offence,
be dismissed on less important occa-
sions, in proportion to their nature,
and the degree of connection with such
persons.

It is generally owing to the nature of the
obligation, and from children
to parents is universally agreed. But
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and founded on the same principles.
Of which the kind and principles
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And what distinction is to be made
between them and others, the par-
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a propensity to preserve and cherish
them, that very few instances, in com-
mon, can be produced, wherein they
fail; but yet it is well known, that

ON PARENTAL AUTHORITY

THAT there is a duty reciprocally owing, in general, from parents to children, and from children to parents, is universally agreed. But a question arises, whether the obligation on both sides be of the same kind, and founded on the same principles? Or whether the kind and principles are different? What these severally are? And what inferences are to be thence drawn?

Parents are generally fond of their children, and have naturally so strong a propensity to preserve and cherish them, that very few instances, in comparison, can be produced, wherein they fail; but yet it is well known, that

some have actually murdered their children, and others have exposed and abandoned them; the former from a fear of shame, and in hope of securing their reputation, and the latter from some other false principles; but in both cases, the motives have been of force enough to overcome the dictates of nature.—Now suppose any of those, which are exposed and abandoned, to be found, preserved, and brought up by a stranger, with the care and tenderness that the best parents have over, and exercise towards, their proper off-spring;—

Q. To whom is the duty of the child owing? To the natural, or to the foster parent? No doubt it will be readily answered, To the foster.—And for this reason, because all that can infer obligation, is done by the latter, that is,

all

all that was kind; indeed the obligation is greater, than would have been that to the real parent, because this stranger was under no special obligation or law of nature, but influenced by mere general humanity.—And what the child owes in this case, is evidently on the principle of gratitude; though acknowledged to be a greater obligation, than it could have had to its natural parent, for the reason assigned above.—And to be impartial, pure and strict duty is rather owing from the parent to the child, who was brought into the world *voluntarily*, on the part of the parent, but *necessarily* on the part of the child; it is therefore natural, reasonable, and a bounden duty in the parent to preserve, nourish, and bring up the child; but the child is

no

no way obliged to the parent, for being merely the instrument of its existence; if it were, those children before-mentioned, that had been exposed and abandoned, would have this obligation remaining, though so unnaturally treated; it follows therefore clearly, that all the duty from children to parents must be founded on the conduct of the parents towards them, and can arise only from a principle of gratitude. There is a natural instinct, universally in all animals, prompting them to the care of their off-spring, and man has this in common with the rest; but perhaps where reason is stronger, the instinct, as such, may be weaker; and *vice versa*, where reason is weaker, instinct is stronger; both which the all-wise Creator has differently dispensed, that

that by proper and sufficient principles, the great ends of providence may be constantly and uniformly produced in all,

Now that which is effected in the lower part of the creation, principally, by what is called instinct, is principally effected in man by reason.—Instances are needless to prove what is so apparent throughout.—One only shall however be mentioned ; the house of a bird, or its nest, is made the first time, and every succeeding time, alike ; and in its kind perfect, and all of the same species similar.—Whereas men, guided by their reason, differ continually not only from each other in their productions, but the same man, from himself, in succeeding productions, by means of his experience,

perience, and the exercise of his reasoning faculty.

The duty of parents to preserve and cherish their off-spring, arises therefore from nature and reason ; *from nature*, as they only of the species were the natural instruments of bringing them into the world, and of whom they are part, insomuch that so doing, they may be said to preserve themselves ; *from reason*, for since the children have a right to preservation and nurture, and no others can be considered as obliged to take care of them, this necessarily devolves on the parents, whose duty therefore it becomes. And here gratitude has no place, (i. e.) from parent to child ; so that the duties of parents and children are founded on different principles, the former on nature and reason, the latter wholly

wholly on gratitude; but gratitude is also allowed to be a duty, and to be natural and reasonable.—Yet it would be mere abuse of words to say, they are therefore founded exactly on the same principles, since gratitude, for benefits received, is the sole foundation in one case; but gratitude is no part of the foundation in the other, where benefits cannot be conferred, at least till long after the duty of nature has been performed. Now a grand point of dispute has been, whether parents have, by the laws of nature, reason, or religion, an absolute and unlimited authority over their children at all ages, and on all occasions; or whether the children are not released from the authority of their parents, at a certain

certain age, or on certain occasions,
and under some circumstances?

I shall consider one case only, in order
to bring the debate to a short issue; for
if in a single instance it can be made
appear, that a child may lawfully act
against the authority of the parent,
then that authority is not absolute and
unlimited; but if, on the contrary, the
conditions and circumstances of this
instance (supposed to be the strongest
that can be urged) are not sufficient to
justify the person so acting, the point
ought to be yielded.

I will suppose a gentleman of thirty
years of age, in possession of an inde-
pendent fortune (by the will or dona-
tion of an uncle, or other relation,) who
is properly and rationally in love
(to use the common expression) with a
lady

lady of equal rank, but small fortune, and of an unexceptionable character, whose family is visited by that of the gentleman, between which families there shall have been a long friendship subsisting, so that a reasonable foundation may be supposed for a mutual esteem, on the best principles, between the young gentleman and lady; in consequence of which, they shall reciprocally prefer each other to all the world.

The son proposes the affair to his father, in hopes of obtaining his consent; the father rejects the proposal with indignation, and refuses his consent, but at the same time makes no objection to the family or lady, whose merit is acknowledged, and offers no other reason for his refusal, but want

of

of sufficient fortune; however is inflexible and determined.—The son remonstrates, that the change of condition proposed, is for himself, not for his father; that he is content with the lady's fortune, and not only so, but that he would prefer this person to any other in the world, if she had less, or even none at all, he having sufficient to answer all his views, and desires no addition to it from his father; all that he intreats of him is, that he would make him happy by his consent, which would crown all his wishes; he beseeches with the greatest earnestness, he engages common friends to represent to his father the reasonableness of his request, and uses all other probable means to influence him, but without success. The parents of the lady, as
 may

may be supposed, have no objections. He waits some years, and during all that time, with the greatest deference and submission, employs all the most persuasive eloquence he is master of, all that the head and heart of a sensible worthy man can suggest to convince the reason, and secure the affection of a father; who, after all, from the sole motive of covetousness, utterly and finally refuses. What is now to be done? It is commonly said indeed, the son has a negative voice, and may reject any proposal from his father; but cannot consistently with his duty, under any circumstances, marry the person to whom the father refuses his consent, whatever may be the motives of such refusal. Take the case as above represented, must the son continue in

this unsettled, undetermined, unhappy situation, for the rest of his life, or the remainder of his father's, which may be as long? Must he waste the best of his days in uncertain hope, or certain despair, not to mention what the acknowledged virtuous and deserving lady suffers all this while; and nothing in the way of their happiness, but the perverse obstinacy of his father! What after all shall prevent their marrying without his consent, sought in vain by all reasonable methods, and refused on such unreasonable grounds? Dury, founded on what? "On nature, reason, son, and religion." In the first place, the son is no way obliged to the father for being the instrument (under providence) of bringing him into the world, as has been already observed; his obligations

tions can only arise from the conduct of the father towards him; and these obligations, it is supposed (in the case before us) have been all along fulfilled on this son's part hitherto.—On *reason*; there can be no reason for an authority exercised to frustrate and destroy the very ends, for which all authority was ever instituted, viz. the good and happiness of those, over whom it is to be exercised. And therefore, there cannot exist such a thing as absolute and unlimited authority among finite, fallible, that is, human creatures.—On *religion*; that is, either natural or revealed; as for as the former, the obligations of it may be deduced from what has been above suggested, the reason, and nature, and fitness of things, necessarily forbidding a subjection to such an autho-

rity as has been disputed.—There remain only the obligations of revealed religion, which the most pious and rational believers contend, is consistent with the moral perfections of the Deity; and must necessarily be so, as well as that any particular passages in such revelation are to be interpreted by them as a rule, on these general suppositions, that whatever comes from God must be worthy of him; and also, that all the parts of any such whole must be consistent one with another.—And therefore, the precepts distinguished by the term *positive*, are all understood, and supposed, to have the same general tendency with those others, contradistinguished by the term *moral*. As to moral, they have been already considered sufficiently, to need no farther enlargement.

enlargement in this place, and for positive, it is presumed, none can be produced that either declare expressly, or from which can be inferred fairly, any such authority; especially when interpreted on the above general, but necessary principles. It has then no foundation in nature, reason, or religion.

As to a question which may be started, who is to be judge in such case, between father and son? Whoever should propose it, could never imagine that such a father (so full of his own unquestionable and indisputable authority) would condescend to refer it to the decision of a third person, how willing soever the son might be to submit to such decision; and though it should be agreed by both parties, to abide by such an

award, it might at last be very unrighteously determined. It may be said again, that neither party must be admitted the judge, because a party. This question looks like a difficulty, but really is none; for how does a wise and good man behave in other cases, who is resolved to regulate his actions by the principles of virtue and religion? Or to whom does he refer himself, as judge of his conduct, but to God?—Or, which is the same thing, as a rule of action (the God within) his conscience, and if, on the strictest examination, he can acquit himself here, he is under no farther concern.

No wise and good man therefore, in the situation of the son above described, and under all the circumstances there represented, could have any reasonable scruples

scruples (after the measures supposed to be taken) concerning the lawfulness of marrying such a person, as above characterised, without the consent of such a father, refused upon such motives.—

On the contrary, he must think it his duty, and could have no reasonable doubt of the approbation of God, and of all unprejudiced good men.

Part of a SPEECH designed for TITUS*,

just when the CORRESPONDENCE between him and LUCIA was discovered.

— “ And is this the conclusion of my triumph? — Alas! what means the noisy multitude? — They see not what the hero feels; a hero, sunk in one short moment from the summit of glory to the depths of perdition, to everlasting infamy.—But what is glory? what is a hero? tho’ formed on the best principles, and always fortunate in his country’s cause? who would still have conquered, but that the envious Gods formed LUCIA on purpose to de-

* See Mr. *Duncombe’s* Tragedy, intituled, *Lucius Junius Brutus*, acted at *Drury Lane House*, in the year 1734.

stroy

stroy his virtue. — If LUCIA had not been, TITUS had never once balanced between virtue and vice. — Was then the divine, the virtuous LUCIA the cause of thy fall from virtue? — Yes; therefore, by that only could TITUS fall. — He was made for virtue; nothing but in that shape could ever inlignuate itself: his well-disciplined heart was proof against every other attack. — How hard a task! too difficult for human minds fraught with human passions! — How nice a thing is virtue, when one single action can level the most virtuous with those whose whole lives have been spent in villainy and baseness, whose very business is wickedness! — Aye — there's the difference; they have no struggles, no checks, nothing to lose. — But thou, against the
strongest

strongest reasons, against habit, and
 against the most sacred and solemn
 vows, who hadst always been superior
 to temptation — even now the greatest
 comfort that remains is, that the black
 design is unexecuted! — But then Lu-
 CIA — Oh! —

REMARKS

REMARKS occasioned by some LETTERS relating to OEDIPUS and CLARISSA.

A. Supposes Oedipus a man of great and shining virtues in general, and also to have acted worthily, even commendably in the rencontre with Laius, and not inconsistently with the strictest morality in his marriage with Jocasta; in the former case, defending himself against the unmerited insult of a stranger, (as he thought) in the latter, espousing a person of suitable rank, and ignorant of her relationship.

According to this representation, he seems no way guilty, and ought to be treated by all the world, as an innocent person;

person; and, in right reason, to esteem himself as such.

That he killed his father, and married his mother, were after discoveries, so that the parricide and incest, he is charged with, were facts, in which he was no more concerned, as a moral and accountable agent, than any indifferent person, who bore no relation to them. This I apprehend to be clear and indisputable, on the genuine principles of natural and rational religion; for otherwise, the most upright, and even the most circumspect person in the world, may not be able to preserve his innocence, but may become culpable by accidents wholly out of his power, and impossible for him to know or foresee; than which nothing can be more discouraging to a man resolved

on

on virtue, and endeavouring to render himself acceptable to the Deity; for if the best intentions, and an uniform course of action, on the best principles, are not sufficient, virtue becomes impracticable.

If A's be not a true and full representation of the case of Oedipus, that does not affect the reasoning above, which will nevertheless be applicable to the case here represented.

B's representation takes in all the circumstances, and situation of Oedipus; as, the prediction of the oracle, his father's marrying in defiance of it, his mother's attempt to elude it, and prevent the threatened consequences, by exposing him to destruction. And after these crimes of his parents, follow his killing Laius, and living in incest with

with Jocasta, whom he *now* discovers to be his father and mother. All this overwhelms him, and he sees his misfortunes to be inevitable, on the principles of the religion and laws of his country, in which he had been educated; and for which he (as well as his fellow-citizens) was supposed to have the highest veneration. Thus circumstanced, and involved in these calamities, perhaps he could act no otherwise than he did; especially as his death was thought a necessary expiatory sacrifice, to relieve his country from the plague. But surely these considerations ought not to have weight elsewhere, under other and more rational principles, or to become a rule and standard universally. His conduct, in these last scenes, was evidently owing to national prejudices,

dices, &c. for supposing all such removed, and that a man (innocent as he really was) resolved to act on the principles of right reason, might he not consider the death of his father as providential, or as a punishment from heaven for his crimes, and as effected by the hand of a stranger, and, with respect to himself, as a natural loss only? As for Jocasta, she was his lawful wife, while he was ignorant of the relationship, and as soon as he became sensible of it, he should have quitted her. Q. Whether, all prejudices laid aside, he might not have acted thus? And though he could not have been so happy, as if none of these events had come to pass, yet he might have been less unhappy than many others of the human species, particularly
 than

than such as are conscious of real guilt, and whose misfortunes do not make them account death preferable to life.

The opinion of the world is out of the present case, for *that* is supposed *here*, as conformable to the reason of things, as is the opinion of the person in question; and the matter being thus considered, glory will not be a motive to quit life.

As for any, who are themselves innocent, being involved in the misery procured by the guilt of those, to whom they may be either by nature, choice, or otherwise, indissolubly attached, these are of all others the most to be pitied and lamented; but are no examples, from which any moral can be drawn of use to such as may be in like circumstances, because their misfortunes being
utterly

utterly inevitable, and brought on them by no crime of their own, can be no proper warning to any; and to say that the guilty persons are the more severely punished by the effects of their crimes reaching to the innocent, how true soever this may be in fact, yet strict justice would revolt at it, and chuse some other means of punishing the criminal, with the severity he may deserve, rather than involve the guiltless, if the nature of things will admit of it; and if it will not, that is another topic, to which this argument does not necessarily lead; since we are here considering only poetical justice: but this may naturally occasion a retrospect to the case of Clarissa, mentioned in a former letter; where it is said, that “ if she is unfortunate

without being criminal, her catastrophe stands condemned, &c." Not surely on Christian principles, for she will be made ample amends in another world: she does not finish unfortunately in the author's own opinion, but gloriously and triumphantly, and is exceedingly happy in her assured expectation of eternal felicity; the consideration of which not only alleviates her present misfortunes, and comforts her under them; but, according to her own sentiments, renders hers a situation rather to be envied than pitied. Not to insist on what B. says, of "the dark dispensations of providence recorded in history, which we find too often there to wish for them elsewhere; and for which" (he says) "we must account in the best manner

“ manner we can ;” perhaps Clarissa’s is the best manner of accounting for them ; that is, on the principles of revelation, referring to a future state : but whether it be so, or not, these things are in the course of providence confessed, by these very records ; and should not morals be rather drawn from things as they are, than as they may be imagined ? These latter reflections arise from the principles of our religion, and are proposed as to Christians, who are taught in this manner to account for all such dispensations. And if it be not thought satisfactory, we have no way left but that of universal reason, or the light of nature, to direct our reasonings and our conduct.

Whether ARTISTS only are proper
JUDGES of the WORKS OF ART.

PAINTING and sculpture have had, in all ages, the greatest and most illustrious princes, the most learned and enlightened people and states, for patrons and protectors, besides innumerable private persons ; who all have with inexhausted curiosity collected, and with the utmost care preserved, the capital productions of these arts ; have considered them as an invaluable treasure, and honoured the artists themselves with their esteem and friendship ; besides rewarding them in the most generous manner, and sometimes without measure. Can it possibly be supposed, that none of these understood what they so much admired,

admired, and purchased at so great expence; or that they did not accurately distinguish the several beauties of these performances? Most certainly they did; and even the several kinds and degrees of excellence; which also farther appears, by the extraordinary praises and elegant descriptions of many of these, still extant in the writings of the ancients.—And why should they not? Since the highest beauties in these performances are not the mere effect of manual operation, or mechanical practice, but depend on invention, on genius, on general understanding, judgment, learning, and knowlege of the human heart.

And indeed if it were true, that none but artists are good judges of these performances, it must follow, that the

arts themselves are not worth cultivating; not only because the artists are so few in comparison of the rest of mankind, but also because (among them) the greatest effects that could be produced by their best works, would be only their mutual admiration, emulation, or envy; no lasting gratification or pleasure to the rest of the world. If this had been the case, both the works and the workmen, whose names are held in the highest veneration, and which have been most justly celebrated by former ages, and to this day, would have sunk long ago into oblivion, and these arts would infallibly have been extinct. For fame and reward, the two most powerful incentives to all our actions, would be wanting to stimulate the artists to great undertakings.

Again;

Again ; a poet, historian, philosopher, or (in general) any man of genius and taste, will conceive of an extraordinary fact or event, just as a great painter would, and may have in him all the requisites of such painter, except the mere mechanical part ; and therefore, must necessarily be a good judge of such a subject executed, and can easily discern when and wherein it is well executed, as to the idea at least.

In short, every man is a judge of the representation, in proportion as he is of the original subject ; a sailor, for instance, is a better judge of the principal circumstances which enter into the composition of a sea-piece, than the best painter in the world, who was never at sea.

An officer, a gentleman, a sportsman, nay a groom, and a jockey are all judges of the representations of horses of the several kinds, of their various attitudes, and of the different manners of riding, suitable to each.

Children, servants, and the lowest of the people are judges of likeness in a portrait; that is, whoever would know the original from every other person, would know the picture, if it be really like. Of this many instances occur every day; and though it may be true (in a certain sense) that of two portraits of the same person, the less like may possibly be the better picture; yet, in that case, it wants the most essential circumstance of a portrait, and if it be pronounced the better picture, the meaning must be, that it is more like nature
in

in general than the other, though it fails in the distinguishing characteristics of the person intended: but even of this many are good judges who are no artists.

Again; all mankind are judges of the passions, and readily see what expression the painter intends, and cannot avoid being properly affected, when these are well executed; and of two pictures, representing the same subject, will see the difference, and prefer the better (at least, this is generally true), and will judge of all the parts of the performance, in proportion as they are more or less acquainted with the original circumstances of the composition.

But those who have extraordinary natural and acquired abilities, who have studied nature, and particularly human
nature,

nature, are the persons, who, in all ages, have best understood, and have, therefore, most admired, fought, and collected these works, and most encouraged and rewarded the performers. And were it not for the protection, patronage, and support of such as have taste, relish, and judgment to distinguish the beauties and excellences of them, the arts (as was said above) would long ago have sunk into oblivion.

On

ON LAWYERS and CLIENTS.

IF the laws of any country are so framed, and the judges so limited and restrained by those laws, that they may not, in any case whatever, deviate from the strictest letter of them, even when a mere mistake in the proceedings may produce the greatest injustice, apparent to every disinterested and impartial hearer, such laws, so rigorously executed, must in many instances frustrate the very end for which they were compiled.

And if there be no court of equity where redress can be obtained (as, it is supposed, may have been the case formerly), then the fate of innocent clients must

must have been indeed irretrievable. And if with such an equity-court, the delay and expence be notoriously great, and the latter in particular such as the already-exhausted party is not perhaps able to support, and therefore cannot take the benefit of it, as is very often the case; how calamitous is the situation of the injured client!

But if, besides all this, these errors in the proceedings (so fatal to the client) are entirely owing to the ignorance, negligence, or knavery of the attorney, or lawyer, employed and paid by such client, how hard is his lot! especially, when he is the only sufferer, who has been guilty of no fault, and the person thus employed and paid by him, and by whose sole misconduct he is thus injured, shall be no way answerable, nor

suffer

suffer at all, nor be obliged to make any reparation, which in reason and equity he ought, not only because he undertook, and received his pay, to conduct an affair which he did not understand, if it miscarried through his ignorance; or because he did not attend sufficiently to his business, if it was owing to his negligence; but especially, because the error was contrived and designed, if the effect of knavery; or, lastly, because it may not be possible to discover to which of these causes the event is to be ascribed; and therefore the worst may pass uncensured under the pretence or appearance of the less criminal. For which reasons it is most manifest, that if these persons, so employed, were to be, in some degree at least, answerable for such errors, it would infallibly have

this

this good effect, that it would make them careful to qualify themselves better; it would render them more cautious and diligent, and might deter them from iniquitous practices; and so produce greater security to the client: for surely it is more just, that they who undertake, are employed, and paid, to manage an affair, should suffer for the miscarriage of it, than they who employ, pay, and entrust them with the management of it, when, and in such cases where, the miscarriage has been entirely owing to their ill conduct.

On the present Method of TRYAL
BY JURIES.

THE intention of the law is undoubtedly, that a man be tried by his peers in the fairest and most impartial way that can be contrived.

The present method is, that “twelve
“good and lawful men be summoned
“by the sheriff from the neighbour-
“hood, &c.”

Now would not any one think that by a law framed for the purpose (as above) these men should be left (without any byas) to their judgments and consciences? and can any thing more equitable be required than that they should freely give their sentiments, as the evidence appears to them? Is it not
the

the pretended design of this law that a man shall not be condemned or acquitted but upon the verdict of a sufficient number of his peers ; which verdict is supposed, nay required, by this law to be the opinion of every one of them ?

But in reality the case is widely different ; for, whatever may be the proper opinion of any of them, they are not allowed to give such opinion as their final judgment, *on pain of death*, if different from the rest. For, in such case, they are obliged by this law to be starved or perjured. Nor is perjury all : they must also condemn or acquit against their conscience ; i. e. condemn the innocent, or acquit the guilty.

If it be said, “ they may, perhaps, “agree after debate,” (which, perhaps, also may not happen), be it so. If then

it be a real, sincere conviction, there cannot be so certain a proof of it, as if they were not under this necessity, since they are obliged to say they agree, whether they do or not. Whereas, were no such difficulty in the way, their real opinion might certainly be known; at least, the real opinion of every honest man, which now cannot be, unless he starve, to prove it. For, doubtless, many a man (otherwise honest) rather than run such a venture (and seeing others obstinate), has been brought over to join with the rest, against conviction.

As to the objection, that “ though
 “ this difficulty were removed, yet we
 “ could not be so absolutely sure of
 “ their real sentiments, because there is
 “ a possibility of bribery still to byass;”
 the answer is, that this does not arise out

of the law itself, as the objection does, and therefore cannot be offered against that argument; but there is no probability of it where the byass is most to be dreaded; that is, there is no probability of bribing an honest man, who is left at liberty by the law to give his verdict: but, if bribery is the worst of all evils to be apprehended in the case, then this law is, for that reason, the worst that can be contrived, because it is constant bribery in its own nature. Can a man be bribed higher than with life or death, which do really in this case depend on preserving his integrity, or giving it up? He must forfeit his life, if he preserves his integrity; he must forfeit his integrity, if he preserves his life. This is literally the case if a man differs from the rest; and who is sure he shall not?

When

When he does not differ, there needs no motive but his own conscience, to make him say so. And therefore it is a foolish law, and frustrates the very end, for which it was intended, viz. that juries should, without byas, fairly try the prisoner; for if you will have twelve men agree, leave them to their judgments and consciences, without any motives, but what arise out of the case and the evidence of it; and then you will have their real sentiments, if honest: If any of them are not, that cannot be helped; but do not lay such temptations in the way of men hitherto honest, in order to make them dishonest.

But, after all, what would you have but their real sentiments? As the law now stands, you are never sure of them. And this law keeps many honest men

from serving their country, who otherwise would have no objection; but would think it their duty, if they could with safety. Whereas dishonest men, in both cases, are ready to avail themselves of any advantages: and therefore this law may justly be said, not only to be an act of bribery itself, but also to encourage it; insomuch that men of bad characters (who are always ready to take bribes) are the most willing to serve on juries, and it has been said, that this is a trade by which many live.

When it is asked, “ what better law
 “ have you to propose, that will answer
 “ the end, and prevent the mischief
 “ complained of?” I answer, that if
 I could not propose such, it does not
 follow

follow, that this is not a wicked and foolish one, which I think has been proved.

But, however, since it is intended by this law, that a man shall be fairly tried by his peers, and since it is never certain, that any number of honest men shall agree, all without exception, in any case short of demonstration, the requiring this absolutely and universally, is requiring an impossibility.

The common sense of mankind has determined, and even the High Court of Parliament itself, that a majority should be decisive in all other cases; and indeed no business could be done otherwise. It is beside the purpose to say, that “ though so great a body as “ the Parliament are not likely to “ agree without exception, yet twelve

“men may :” Why twelve rather than twenty ? Is there any magic in the number twelve, or in any other number greater or less ? Again : Is not the House of Lords the highest court of judicature in the nation ? And do not they condemn or acquit by a majority ? But it does not follow, that because the majority are to decide (suppose in a jury) that such majority must needs be a majority of one only, though such is good in the highest court of all : it may be of eleven to one ; perhaps all twelve may agree ; or rather an odd number. And it is not to be doubted, but much the greater number would generally be of the same opinion. For argument’s sake, let it be supposed that the law had been, that each juryman, in all the
 tryals

tryals for a year past, might have given his own opinion without restraint; and the judgment of the majority should have been the verdict. In this case, all the verdicts, for the year past, would have been the same as they have been; consequently the same justice would have been done; and with this advantage, that no man would have forced his conscience, or have been byass'd by his fears.

If it be said, "perhaps, they would not have been the same," then I answer, they would have been better, and more justice would have been done, since the only alteration is taking off a byass, which sometimes might influence; but which every honest man would wish taken off, for that reason.

If this be not satisfactory (though I suppose it must be so, unless from long prejudice, prescription, or authority), let then the number be greater; for example, fifteen or eighteen, and if twelve say *guilty*, that be the verdict, if less than twelve, *not guilty* be the verdict: though a majority is still preferable, as being most natural, and attended with fewer difficulties.

When it is said, that “ the verdicts
 “ would have been better, if any should
 “ have been different from what they were,
 “ on the supposition that a majority had
 “ been to determine the verdict ;” the
 meaning is, that it is probable (at least possible) that an obstinate minority may, on some occasions, have prevailed even on a majority to join with them, against conviction, rather than starve, seeing no
 hopes

hopes of gaining them; and if a minority ever prevails over a majority, in such case an *apparent* unanimity is less than a *real* majority: but by how much the less this is probable, by so much the stronger is the argument, that a majority should always determine the verdict; since, if a majority will not yield to a minority, however obstinate, and whatever the consequence, then the opinion of such majority is the natural verdict.

Upon the whole, is it not most reasonable that an odd number should be the jury, and that a majority of that number should make the verdict? And would not this be the wisest, the fairest, the safest, and the most equitable law that could be contrived, to answer all the purposes

poses intended by the legislature; and
to be wished by the subject, in every
capacity, whether a juror, a prisoner,
or a plaintiff?

A TRANSLA-

[106]

poles intended by the legislature and
to be wished by the subject in every
capacity, whether a juror, a witness,
or a plaintiff?


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TRANSLATION

O F

Mr. BROWNE'S POEM,

De Animi Immortalitate.




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The following TRANSLATION was made soon after the Publication of the ORIGINAL, before any other Translation had appeared, and intended to be so close and literal as even to preserve (in some degree) the LATIN Phraseology.



O N

The Immortality of the SOUL.



B O O K I.

ALL other animals, throughout the earth, enjoy the lot which Nature hath assigned to them, nor do they wish for more. Man only, who is sagacious to apprehend, who hath the strongest desire to search out the causes and mutual relations of things, enters on a vain enquiry; for Death, with his black wings, hovers over him, and stops him in the midst of his career.

Why this, if Divine Wisdom hath created nothing without design? Why these seeds of a heavenly mind, if they may not ripen into their proper fruit? For what can it profit him, to know the causes of things, to join the present with the future, and, in his mind, to soar above the sun, and the stars, who is on the brink of the grave, since one, and the same law of death, the same common sepulchre, awaits all? Is it not then better to toy with *Phyllis* in the shade, and to celebrate thee, O father *Lyæus*, in jocund dance? For *Bacchus* knows to dispell cares, knows to abolish the sense of the past, and fear of the future.

Come on, then ; pour out your wine, let not feasts and banquets be wanting, not *Chloe* skilful in singing, and *Neera* who

who knows so well to touch the lute ; joyfully snatch the blessings of the passing day, nor anxiously enquire what to-morrow may bring forth.

But, we are soon tired with these delights ; for sensual pleasure is scarce tasted before it satiates ; therefore, quitting trivial enjoyments, let us seek such as are serious. Let riches be accumulated ; go whither glory or ambition leads the way, surrounded with a thick swarm, at your morning levee. Why many words ? Here also, at last, you are brought to the same point, and are forced to exclaim “ Alas ! how much vanity in all things ! ” What way, therefore is to be tried ? where the friendly shore ?

For you see that the mind, while it is imprisoned in the body, always covets

to learn one thing after another, and without end, step by step (so nature leads us on,) to reach eternal truth.

Besides, it seeks not these fleeting delights, but such as are more suitable to itself, and which are not subject to any vicissitudes, delights not to be destroyed by time.

Wherefore take courage; for neither does Divine Wisdom spend its labour in vain, nor shall the soul be confined within those limits, which circumscribe this perishable body, but (innocent of earthly blemish) flourishes, and shall flourish to eternity: and when it has thrown off its bodily chains, as from a prison, being free, shall seek again its native heaven, like an old inhabitant, shall drink nectar from the fountain of perpetual

perpetual truth, and shall for ever feed on ætherial fruits.

But, indeed, while life remains (if that can be called life, which is shut up in the blind shell of the body), the lively force of the mind languishes, nor does she expand her triumphant wings; she retains however many signs of her ancient extraction; for whence does she remember so many things? Whence dispose so many in apt order, and then bring them forth into use? For this so rich and immense furniture could in no wise be contained, crowded in the storehouse of the body, or by mere corporeal energy be recalled into light.

Besides, that inventive power which hath produced the various arts, supplying both safety and elegance to our indigent life; which hath given names

to things, and hath linked together the
 several parts of discourse by letters ; or
 which hath brought men (living like
 wild beasts, and dispersed) to associate
 in cities ; or which hath tamed them
 by laws, and compelled them to unite
 in one band ; what is this power, but
 a diviner energy, and heavenly sense,
 and virtue excited by a celestial inspira-
 tion ?

Again ; the eloquence which flows
 with a copious stream, and hurries
 away the passions whither it pleases,
 and mingles lightning with thunder,
 whence does it draw its stores ? That
 sparkling vigour, does it sound mortal ?
 What think you of the songs of the
 poets ? For whether by a change of
 numbers, and their harmonious powers,
 the poet captivates, as he slides into the

ear with varied sweetness, or whether he chants marvellous yet probable things, playing with feigned imagery, and thus makes his progress through the inmost recesses of the heart, he surely breathes nothing mean, nothing that is not sublime.

And as whatsoever things are done on earth, and all those which we see revolving still in the same course, satisfy not the mind, which demands greater things, and much different; behold the Divine Poet is at hand, by whom springs up a more sublime order, and a more beautiful species, and more suited to the desires of the mind, the hope and presage of a future life.

What think you of those who know to describe the heavenly motions, by what law the stars are carried round the

sun, by what the comets are driven
through the void immense; how, in
the vast æther, other fixed stars en-
lighten other planets; are you not con-
vinced that this mind, which, even now,
takes its flight to heaven, and among
the stars, being thence descended, returns
thither in thought, from whence it
came, and revisits its native home?

How then could these things be,
unless ascertain force, peculiarly its own,
subsisted in the mind, exempt from
all mixture of matter? Moreover, it is
conscious to itself, wills, refuses, hates,
and loves, and fears, and hopes, rejoy-
ces, and grieves, by its own proper
efficacy; nor does it need any assistance
of the body: itself compares its own
powers among themselves, separates
the idea of one thing from that of an-
other,

other, gathers by degrees the loose and scattered parts of truth, and adjusts them amicably: Hence extracts the causes of things, and hence builds arts, on arts, in a beautiful gradation; and approaches more and more to the lofty summit, from whence the whole series of causes appears, and the whole chain let down from the throne of the Deity to earth; and lastly it descends into itself, and sees, within, the ideas of things, and how every one springs up; and whence it thinks, and almost knows even what is its own fabrick. Is there so much energy in body? Did ever any machine perceive its own powers, or that which supplied it? For every body is nothing but a machine, impelled by external motion, not internal and its own.

Measure not therefore the powers of the exalted mind by the pursuits of the vulgar; but contemplate those men, even now, recent in fame, whom *Athens*, or *Rome*, or *England* (not yielding to either) hath produced, *England* the nurse of heroes, while time was, in a better age.

Why should I recount to you so many poets blest with Divine Inspiration, or so many inventors of laws, or able orators?

Or why those, by whom science has been brought forth into light, till then covered with fordid rubbish, and shunning the day? But, above all, *Bacon* (effulgent as the ætherial sun) opened a way to all arts. He first recalled wisdom from foolish fictions, going by a secure road wherever faithful experiment

riment conducted; he it was that marked out the path even to *Newton*, holding out and transmitting the lamp of knowledge to him.

Illustrious souls! if any thing mortal affects heavenly inhabitants, if yet you have any regard for *Britain*, renew, I intreat you, in us, our pristine vigour; that so, at length (having shaken off our slumber) we may aspire to high attainments, mindful of true virtue and ancient praise.

Indeed I can scarce conceive, that such great endowments could appear in these men, unless by Divine Impulse; but God has at all times strewed here and there (like stars) certain splendid luminaries, as it were, of the mind, to the end, that a degenerate age, warmed
by

by these examples, should exert itself,
and should acknowledge how sublime is
their original.

Besides, there is no one who does
not conceive, that there is truly some-
thing which belongs to us, after
death, within ; it is taught us within ;
learned antiquity bears witness to it ;
the public voice declares it ; nor are
there any nation so barbarous, that do
not look beyond the grave, and carry
their expectations still farther.

Hence is planted the oak, slowly
growing, a posthumous reward, the
inheritance of childrens children ; and
hence the vast structure of pyramids
stands in defiance of ages.

Hence all that care of extending the
limits of life, by a name after life ;
hence surviving fame becomes of so
much

much account, that whoever excels in genius refuses not to subject himself to any dangers, nor to undergo any labours, that he may challenge to himself the semblance of a future life, and a lasting reputation that may reach his distant posterity.

Do we not see that a man convicted of a capital crime, even on the brink of the grave, yet denies the crime; a liar, that he may preserve his honour, and his fame? For nature hath implanted in the mind these tokens, and obscure notions of the future; hence are we solicitous what posterity shall think of us; but the voice of posterity is nothing to us, if we shall be only dust and shade; fame arrives then too late, and affects not our peaceful ashes.

Moreover,

Moreover, what mean funeral solemnities? What that anxious care about the dead, and the laboured bulk of a sepulchre? For some consign the lifeless corpse to the earth, and place garlands on the tomb, and perform every year sacred rites; as if the manes demanded these offerings; others burn the limbs on a funeral pile, and collect the ashes, and deposit them in a faithful urn, that so the remains may out-last ages.

Why should I recount those, whom the overflowing *Nile* waters with his rich stream? These (according to the custom of their fathers) burn not their dead, nor bury them in the earth; but first divest the bodies of their bowels, and cleanse them; then they pour in a quantity of odorous frankincense, and pitch,
and

and fill them with clammy bitumen ;
 these being completed, they bind them
 over with many bandages, that each
 part may aptly cohere ; the painted
 image of the living person adorns the
 superficies : thus natural is the hope,
 and thus imprinted the confidence in
 every one, that even after the members
 are dissolved in death, yet our better
 part shall remain, which neither the
 power of fate shall destroy, nor shall
 devouring time abolish.

Behold the shores which *Indian Gan-*
ges washes ; there a nation of people
 throw themselves into the flames, impa-
 tient of life, or spontaneously render
 them up at the very altars of their Gods,
 smitten with a blind desire of going
 where the fates have granted happy
 abodes,

abodes, where there is perpetual spring
and suns serene without a cloud.

Nor are the Eastern wives less celebrated by fame; these bewail not the deaths of their husbands with tears, or female shrieks; but (wonderful to relate) they mount the funeral pile, and are devoured in the same flame, surely believing they shall thus accompany their husbands, and renew their nuptials in the shades.

Behold where *Boreas* and eternal frosts reign, nations unconquered in war; a like ardour appears in all, a like contempt of life carries them on thro' fire and sword, fierce in invincible courage: what is it rouses this enthusiastic rage, what is it that urges them on, unless it be the sweet image of a life,
for

for ages, promised to the good, on account of their merits to their country?

Add to these, what is related of the *Elysian* fields, of the *Stygian* lake, and of the river *Pblegethon*.

But these, you will say, are feigned by the fraud of priests. What is that to the purpose? for unless these ideas of the future, tho' imperfect, were first of all implanted, or natural, there could be no room for fraud, for all fictions are built upon some ground of truth.

But because it is difficult to conceive what the mind is by itself, without the body, and to separate it from material sense, the vulgar attribute to it corporeal forms, give it like aspects, give it members like the real, give it the similitude of body, by confining it to a certain place; whence others, to whom these

these notions seem absurd, and foolish, and to whom it does not appear in what manner the soul can survive after death, suppose it altogether extinct in the common grave, either because they will not be at the pains to learn, or else because they count it shameful to confess themselves ignorant of any thing, for it is not a slight task to sift the truth from fiction. Shake off sloth therefore, nor reject the truth on account of the fables which iniquitous fraud has interspersed, or the vain petulance of poets.

What! does not universal consent prove that there is a God, that consent which is justly reputed the voice of nature? But how false and unworthy things of the Deity do men feign? for they attribute to God human characters, and multiply the number of Gods,

just

just as hope elevates, or fear depresses
 their unstable minds; for what? the
 things they thought useful, these were
 Gods propitious to them, and the
 things which they feared, they ascribed
 to Dæmons, and their madness was so
 great, that intoxicated antiquity wor-
 shipped deformed beasts, and even the
 onion and leek.

Therefore that Attic prince of wis-
 dom, considering these things, foretold
 that the time would come, in a complete
 revolution of years, that one should arise
(and now time has brought forth to us,
what we long wished for, the assistance and
presence of a God)* who (like the rising
 of the sun) would dispell the darkness of
 the mind, and lead us thro' secret paths,

* VIRG. *Æn.* viii. 200.

he himself guiding our steps by a sure clue.

In the mean time we may discern the truth by many signs, nature directing us, as it were thro' a cloud. Therefore go on, let us follow whither conjecture leads us, nor despise the assistance, if any, which reason supplies.

I deny not indeed that the mind accords with the body, in many respects (that is owing to the mutual league between them); but the same mind is in many other respects unlike, and proves herself to be of a different nature, and proceeding from a divine stock.

We often see the bodily powers firm and strong, when the mind is dull; and very often the most piercing strength of mind in a weak body. Moreover, if the mind could perish, with the perish-

ing

ing body, by the same rule, it is reasonable, that it should grow sick, with the sick body, the contrary of which we see frequently happen ; for when the whole bodily frame languishes, at the approach of death, then is the force of the mind more quick and lively, and its fervor divine, its eloquence never sweeter, and at that very time prophetic sayings drop from the dying lips.

Again ; if the mind is formed of corporeal elements, how comes it that in dreams, when the inlets of sense are shut, and there remains no external object, which can supply food to the mind, she then is more vigorous ? Then, indeed, she exerts her proper strength, then she supports herself with exulting wings, like a bird, which haply escaped

VOL. II.

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from

from its cage, is transported flying aloft, and rejoices in open air.

Now if the nature of the soul be corporeal, it must necessarily be composed of an infinite number of particles, therefore each particle must have its proper sense, and each its proper will, and so many minds drawing different ways; say then, amidst this confusion, and in such a contest, by what means can true and right consist, and one tenor of life, and this same conscious virtue?

But haply the energy of the mind consists in a certain position and figuration of matter, as if square figures were more intelligent than round. Whether you take away or add parts, it is the same thing, and in whatsoever form the parts of matter may be disposed, it

is

is to the mind no more than whether the colour be white or black.

But truly all that power which thinks, is produced by some certain motion: what cannot motion effect? Yes, will itself, discourse, reasoning, and the knowledge of things, depend on levers and pulleys; thus we may suppose a top, put in motion by a boy, to catch genius, and grow wise under the lash: by parity of reason also, liquor, as it grows hot in a cauldron, swells, and overflows with a rich vein of eloquence.

But whence arises motion? The mind alone, doubtless the mind, not the dull body, is the fountain and original of motion: and as God directs the world by his will, and his nod, so does the

mind, from within, the whole mass of the body.

Forbear, therefore, to wonder how the mind can live stripped of the body ; I wonder rather, by what power it can perish : in as much as it consisteth not of parts, and cannot be torn asunder, or hurt by an external stroke : and besides she is her own mover, not moved from without ; but whatsoever moves itself by its own powers, will live to eternity, because it will never desert itself.

But you will say, it is not easy to conceive, that any thing can exist, if you take away form and position ; what then think you of the Deity ? For neither does the Divine Mind receive any form, (as far as we can know) nor is circumscribed by any place, unless perhaps you fancy God himself to be matter ; but

but if indeed he is truly a spirit, and a being unmixed, and pure, and removed from all dregs of body, in like manner we should think of the human mind.

For what is there that has more powers of its own, or more partakes of an ethereal substance, or more discovers a Divine Original? And therefore, even while the bands of bodily connection remain, she looks frequently abroad, notwithstanding, and prepares herself for flight; and as a guest not an inhabitant of earth, is carried upwards, and rejoices to revisit her native seat.

Go now, admire the frail loan of life; busy here and there, as a fly, with shining wings, flutter about, sip the dew, feed upon air, a while, soon to

return to nothing, and hopeless. Is this the sum of life? So vain our wishes? Does what we promise ourselves fall thus short? Oh! how much more truly may that be called life; that, the life of man, when it shall be given to discern truth, not, as we now do, by degrees, compelled to go through long windings, by dint of meditation, but at once, in one view, and every cloud then removed!

But the mind cannot know, perhaps you will answer, when the senses are extinct; from this fountain flows knowledge: by this it is nourished and grows; this failing, it will perish.

But what will you say then, if art assists the senses, imperfect as they are of themselves, and gives them powers which nature denied them? Art hath
added

added eyes to our eyes, ears to our ears.

Hence during this life, the mind raises itself above human condition, and situation ; now it calls stars from heaven ; now, by a superior power of its own, discloses the innermost secrets of the earth ; and those things which escape the natural eye, even the smallest bodies, it brings forth into light, and lays open the miracles of a new world.

What, moreover, when the mind corrects the errors of the senses, and, itself being judge, decrees contrary to the suffrages of sense, concerning the form, and mass, and distances of things ?

Do not these tokens discover a power distinct from sense, and a heavenly origin ? Wherefore, when this system shall be dissolved, it is credible that the soul,

which now before-hand makes its efforts, and short excursions, shall at last be able to enjoy a freer flight, and sally forth into all truth.

If you ask how this is to be accomplished; as yet, it is not fit we should know, nor is that our business; know you what sort of life, that was, which you had in your mother's womb? Did he, who was blind from his youth, know the delightful shades of colours? True, you say, but he even perceives, that others enjoy what is denied to him, equally entitled to the same privileges with those of the same species.

The mind, in like manner, sees nothing here whatsoever, and wheresoever it be, throughout the whole earth, adequate to its wishes; but that all things are base, and trifling, in comparison

rison of the character of eternal beauty, which he cherishes in his breast, who is possessed of the vigour of genius, and whose thoughts are employed about sublime matters. This only, therefore, he most ardently wishes for himself, in this his soul is entirely engaged: he, being absent, pines with the never ceasing love of this absent good; avoiding the company and resort of men, like a true lover, he frequents the groves, and fountains, and the most secret recesses, alone; where he may meditate by himself, and now with wisdom, now with verse, sooth his anxious cares.

Wherefore he seems to me to have lived happy, who, after having beheld this solemn theatre of the world, with an equal mind, this sun, the earth, the sea,

sea, the clouds, and the element of fire,
 forthwith returns from whence he came,
 like a guest satisfied with his entertain-
 ments. For whether you reckon an
 hundred years of life, or whether you
 count but few, you behold these same
 things revolving again; than these no-
 thing better, nothing newer: what-
 ever time, therefore, you pass on earth,
 account of it as passing at a com-
 mon fair; or as at a spacious inn for
 travellers, where life fluctuates at haz-
 ard, amidst a thousand trifles, a thousand
 employments; he that withdraws first,
 first gains the port; well then, hoist
 your sails, speedily, lest perchance your
 provisions should fail. Why do you
 linger? Diseases approach, the untimely
 deaths of your friends, and age beset
 round with snares.

Whither

Whither am I carried? For it is not lawful to depart without the command of him, who hath placed us in this station of the world, between hope and fear, that we should follow the standard of our leader. Whatever shall come to pass, God himself commands us to endure, therefore it is to be endured.

But if I were persuaded, and it were fixed in my mind, that nothing survived the grave, I would quickly depart hence; and go where all, sooner or later (having acted their part on the stage), sleep, in eternal night; yea if God would offer to renew my youth, or that I should again become an infant; I would refuse.

Nor even if there should fall to my lot, all that can render life happy,
strength

strength of genius, eloquence, pru-
 dence, morals, honour obtained without
 envy, a race of sons, all illustrious both
 by their parents virtue, and their own;
 no, not with so great blessings, would
 I deign to go over again the same
 ground, and roll round the same orb:
 for the mind seeks more noble things;
 nothing mutable, nothing perishable, is
 adequate to its exalted hopes.

BOOK

BOOK II.

GOD then has given, in all other things which he has created, evident tokens of a benign intention. All may be happy, we only excepted; we, the principal production on earth; we, the image of the Divine mind, we are exercised with undeserved calamities!—Not so!—Forbear, then, these complaints of the Deity.

However, take a survey, with me, of human life. You must acknowledge how great a multitude of evils, on every side, oppress, not this or that man, as by chance, but almost all the race in a mass, and without distinction. How many thousands the fury of war, how many thousands fierce tyranny destroys, or loads with cruel chains; and from
time

time to time devises new arts of tormenting! Why should I mention those miserable wretches, whom dire famine consumes, where all things for sustenance abound, or whom the raging power of disease snatches away, or wastes by slow degrees with pining anguish; and all these guiltless? For I will not deign to say what numbers women, or wine, and their own crimes, have generally destroyed. What avails virtue? where are the rewards of sacred morals? I ascribe to virtue as much as one ought: That the evils of life, which it cannot prevent, it may teach to assuage by enduring; it may comfort, by a better hope; and it may reconcile a man to himself: it may moderate the turgid violence of wrath, and of love: but yet so far is it from being a defence,

and a sure guard against all accidents ;
 that on the contrary (if I may be allowed
 to say so), even virtue itself, often, ex-
 poses to manifest dangers. It is the in-
 terest of those to be wicked, who are
 compelled to obey a despotic prince.
 All tyrants hate probity. How many,
 who have merited well of their fellow-
 citizens, have perished by the blind fury
 of those very men whom they have pre-
 served ! And again ; if any one excels
 in genius, all the envy of low minds
 conspires against him, ready, with a vi-
 per's tooth, to gnaw and to sprinkle
 poison on his fame. But suppose that
 he should dispell the cloud which ob-
 structs his merit, and emerging at last,
 with difficulty, should be distinguished
 by public trusts ; he must toil for an
 ungrateful race of men, must bear all
 kinds

kinds of contumelies; dangers must be encountered, which either the sedition of the vulgar, or the ambition of the powerful, may bring upon him. Let *him* hear this, who challenges a name and honours for himself, mad as he is, nor knows what evils may encompass him.

Do those in private life fare better? No less, in that station, you perceive that anger, lust, wickedness, reign every where; and fraud counterfeiting friendship, and malignant envy, and contentions, and treacheries, and the snares of iniquitous law.

But perhaps you have an amiable consort, the balm of life: chearful at home, you pass your leisure in security; your sweet children smile around you, and hasten to your embraces; the future

ture honour and defence of your advancing age. Here is, or no where, that which we seek : Be it so; but, in the mean time, do no cares mar these joys ? Why should I recount the evils which arise when it happens (as but too often) that discordant tempers lead both parties to contrary pursuits ? Add to this, that it is not easy to know each other's disposition, before they have confirmed the matrimonial contract : nor, if they repent, is it lawful to break the chain ; but their hard lot remains ; the die of life is cast.

Besides, who can ensure you children endued with a virtuous disposition ? tenacious of what is comely, and of what is good ? But if, in this respect, all things answer to your wishes ; alas ! when you least apprehend it, in the very

flower of youth, unexpected death snatches away, in a moment, all the hope of your family.

But, you will say, virtue does not produce these evils: true, we confess it, if every one faithfully performed his duties, there would be nothing preferable to virtue; then indeed would the golden age return; but it has not fallen to our lot to live in that age.

On these considerations, certain philosophers feign two Gods, two principles of the world; of whom the one, endued with a malignant disposition, sends all the evil into the world; the other, a sovereign remedy against evil, is always ready with his powerful influence.

Hence the varied complection of life, hence the mixed crop of evil, and good,
and

and the mischievous snake lurking in gardens of roses.—And is it thus that they solve the question? But that power, I would ask, which you ascribe to the Gods, is it equal, or unequal? If it be indeed equal, either all things would immediately rush into the original *Chaos*, or nothing could arise from it; for as much as, good is a cause always contrary to evil: and if unequal, there would be no interval, but one being vanquished, must give place to the power of the other, and the conqueror would immediately obliterate all marks of their former contest. Away, then, with these foolish solutions of the *Magi*, and the double-formed monsters, which the muddy *Nile* hath brought forth.

Does the *Stoic* reason better? He truly reckons not those things good, which we foolishly admire: riches, fame, and whatsoever comes from without us, the wise man accounts as nothing; or he alone possesses these things, possesses, unknown as he is, and poor; indeed! how fine a thing it is to be wise! in like manner, neither does he account pain an evil, herein also consistent with himself.

You may burn him in the fire; or deliver him up to be hacked with a sword; you may nail him to a cross; you shall never extort from him an acknowledgment that these are evils; what are they then? Inconveniences, he says. What think you of health, what of beauty, *Stoic*? What of robust strength? Are these good things, or not?

not? They are not to be wished, truly, but to be accepted; who can bear this sophister, teaching things, in words, indeed different, not in sense?

What need of many arguments? You might hope to live happy, without external things, if you were nothing but spirit: in the mean time, *Stoic*, remember to acknowledge what sort of a being you are; you are a man who consists of body as well as mind.

But in truth, if whatsoever things happen to us from without, these fortune gives, and takes away, propitious and envious by turns, now to me, now to another; nor is there any thing which we can call our own; if indeed this be the case, what then becomes of the wise man, who (not less than our-

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selves)

selves) wavers, changing with every accident of a doubtful hour? Moreover this firmness of mind, on which depend all those things that you reckon desirable, how often is disease wont to abate its vigour, how often to destroy it, so that scarce any signs of it remain!

Even * he who by his counsels, as also that † other who by arms, restored the *British* affairs, when there was scarce any hope, testify how great things valour can do, how great wisdom, and how fading a thing is even the flower of genius.

Then ‡ he again, more modern, whom we of a later age have seen, who carried the palm in every kind of

* Lord Somers. † D. of Marlborough. ‡ Dr. Swift.

writing, whether he played the part of a humorous writer, or that of an orator and a poet; alas! how great a man! nor was it long before we saw him existing, when the faculties of his mind were dead, and the survivor (as it were) of himself: Thus nothing is proof against external strokes.

Your opinion, *Stoic*, is notwithstanding pardonable; for if, after death, there are neither rewards nor punishments, alas! what becomes of us; what, after all, remains? Truly, either the Deity governs human affairs unjustly; or, is negligent, and takes no care of them; or, if he orders the world well, no good man is miserable, no wicked man can be happy in life, as your own sect teaches.

O, blind understandings of men !
 who no sooner reach the confines of
 truth, but there stop short ; and, thun-
 derstruck as it were, leave their work
 unfinished when it is near its comple-
 tion. Can you, *Stoic*, acknowledge the
 justice of God, and yet not perceive
 what it, properly, means ?

Why then dare you not vigorously
 proceed in the part which leads to eter-
 nal life ? “ Whatsoever that is, the
 “ night, surrounded with darkness,
 “ conceals.” Not so, but rather your
 own confidence blinds you ; hence is
 that night, hence that darkness ; for
 though you triumph, you are not, yet,
 master of the argument ; because, not
 knowing how to lay the whole together,
 you stop in the midst of the course ;
 like all the rest, whether the Magi of
Persia,

Persia, or the wise men of *Greece*. Behold with how many monstrous notions, one error terms !

Take the matter as I shall now deduce it. We all of us acknowledge a God ; if then the Being who hath produced this frame of the world, and governs it, be wise and just ; “ whatever is, is “ right,” (as sings the poet) nor can justice or equity suffer, that the good should always be unhappy, or that wickedness should always triumph ; but the matter comes to this, if we all perish entirely, by death. Whatever is, is indeed right, if you will take in the whole ; the contrary is true, if nothing of us survives the grave ; a good and a wise man connects one life with the other. But there are, who, resting at the bare letter, consider things partially
and

and comprehend not the vast system of the universe; therefore these confine the whole scene to the present life; hither betake themselves the whole band of thieves, and every adulterer; to this refuge the very assassin flies, as it were to an altar.

It should seem, you think, that God himself has appointed laws, according to an established order, which no one can violate, whether he be good or bad, what matters it? Man can repeal nothing here, can change nothing; things will, for ever, keep their stated course.

Tell me, What laws do you mean, or what is that order? For there is one law for mankind, another for the brute animals, and a third for the inanimate mass of things.

Matter

Matter has its own gravitation: hence, it does not attract by its proper force, but is attracted; hence, being incited, it produces various motions; hence the system and machine of the world subsists.

Why should I mention those creatures to whom animal life is given, either the winged kind, or cattle; or the savage race of wild beasts? or those which the sea nourishes in its fruitful bosom? Not any one of these wanders, at random, without a law, but either is directed by the inspiration of the Divine breath, or these have so much reason as is necessary for their purposes.

To these it is given to go certain lengths. You see every one cunning to provide its own sustenance: each manages dexterously his own weapons; and
brings

brings forth its young, and nourishes, with proper food, those which it has brought forth, as long as the parents care is needful. This is the task, and this the whole pleasure of their life : nor do they wish or fear any thing beyond ; happy enough in this situation.

But man has a larger field laid open to him. He, with a subtle genius, discovers signatures of the supreme Artificer, throughout this immense work, the world ; a work, abounding with so many wonders. Instructed by such tokens, he invokes, by prayer, the Lord and Father of all things ; and, endued with the love of what is excellent, proposes to himself the Divine example, that, from thence, he, by imitation, may be able to form his morals. And as nothing is more beautiful, nothing more divine,

divine, than that goodness which provides for others and is diffused abroad ; he deems another's affairs, with respect to himself, not another's ; nor revolves always about his own axis, as provident only for himself ; but, dilating himself, comprehends his country, and the whole race of men, and every kind of animals, in the great compass of his orbit.

Nature hath also established these perpetual laws of life, when she framed man helpless in himself ; that one should ask assistance of another, and that all (by turns) should offer their counsel for the common good by the aid of speech. For, compare yourself with other creatures : is not the human form less armed for defence ? But yet, how great are the powers of man, and how unconquerable his strength ; if common friendship,

ship, like the power of gravitation, binds them in one league, and joins together the scattered members?

This law, therefore, this law is engraven on the mind; is ratified by the kind sanction of God: this, utility itself approves: hither his native happiness draws every one.

But what avails all this? Do not you see unbridled lust, or evil habit, or even ignorance, what havock do they make! how small a part of mankind is happy! For, contemplate those parts where the sun rises, or sets; or those where *Boreas* reigns, or the utmost South; or where the earth is scorched by perpetual heat: how great, there, is the poverty and sloth! how great darkness is spread over these savage souls, and frantic error!

You

You can scarce discern any traces of man besides the form.

What shall be said of us, to whom God himself has granted more abundant lights of salvation, and whom religion leads, as by the hand, a holy guardian; leads, not drives by imperious force? Lo we, reluctant, hate the immortal sun-beam, and the offered day, and follow vain comments; the vain glosses of sophisters leaving the light. For this jargon, alas! we contend unappeasedly. What slaughter has arisen from hence; how much kindred blood has been shed, how many impious deeds has (the pretence of) piety brought forth!

To such a degree does the wicked licentiousness of manners confound all right, and wrong, raging with impunity throughout the earth. This is that

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gigantic force which endeavours to scale heaven, and boldly to pile mountains on mountains. Does God behold these things, and not hurl his thunderbolts? or, does nothing of human affairs affect immortal minds? He beholds: his rewards shall follow every man according to his merits, though not immediately, nor is punishment less certain for being delayed.

I doubt not, indeed, that God, even now, interposes in human affairs; and, lest all notion of the Divine avenger should fail, he hath given signal examples, among the nations, by marvellous ways, but yet sparingly: not continually, as rash superstition pretends, which turns the anger of the Deity against whomsoever it pleases, and wrests from the Thunderer his own arms.

Nor

Nor am I ignorant what the mind, conscious to itself, can do; inasmuch that, neither is virtue, even now, without any reward, nor do you, who are wicked, escape all punishment in this life; although you may deceive men, you cannot however fly from yourself; dire remorse agitates you, anxiety gnaws you, cruel companion! and the avenger dwells in your reproaching breast.

Why should I recount, how often, grievous distempers, the due rewards of excess, slow phthisic, and the acute torments of the gout, and swelling dropsy, and cramps, and burning fevers attack you, a deadly band! Hence, if any portion of life remains, it is consumed in cruel anguish; and those whose only hope is placed in this life,

are weary of living, and at the same time both with death, and fear it.

But if any one of these should arrive at old age, he has not wherewith to compensate the inconveniences attending it; for neither does he gather the sweet fruits of friendship, nor enjoy the praise of good men, and his own, whenever he revolves his past actions; and the companions of his former excesses fly him, at this time; the vile parasite also deserts the empty tables; and his own image affrights him, when he turns his eyes inward, and while he surveys himself he is astonished. But when death is at hand, and brandishes his javelin, now and again aiming the stroke, to what arts has he not recourse, anxious to prolong his miserable life, ever so little, by the help of medicine;

and

and that, through a thousand cares?
 But if life is full of evil, and if there
 is nothing of us, which remains after
 death, why should the last hour terrify?
 So it is, there still sticks close to him,
 that which he would fain despise, I
 know not what importunate concern
 about his future lot.

But on the contrary, those whose
 life has been without guile, and without
 crime, and who have known to gain
 over others to themselves by deserving
 well, or who have enriched the age
 with noble inventions; in these, con-
 scious praise flowing from a Divine foun-
 tain, calms the mind, and attempers
 the chearful countenance. No fear
 breaks their rest, no envious care.
 Not women, nor wine, have wasted
 their strength, nor do unfortunate ac-

cidents depress, or fortunate elate them: he who has a hope of hereafter, is fortified against all casualties.—Therefore, when years gently gliding bring on old age, by degrees, he beholds approaching death with such a mind, as one who, agitated by long tempests, has in view the port, and considers it, as an escape from all the evils of life. Indeed, the approach of death terrifies that man only, who presages evil to himself, if any part of him should survive the grave; not this who hath led a righteous, and holy life. He, on examining, applauds himself, and bright, as the sun, even to his setting, smiles with a diffused light: he, when the seasonable day of mortality arrives, looks up to an immortal life: he, triumphing in a better hope, tastes before hand the

the joys of an heavenly inhabitant in his wishes. Such was he, whom I always remember with a grateful mind, he, an honour to the mitre, a guardian of liberty whilst the times wanted so great a champion, *Hough*. He, when he had nearly completed the number of an hundred years, full of fresh honour, his senses entire, without disease, free from pain, and fatiated with living, so quitted life as an excellent actor leaves the stage, applauded by the whole theatre; or as a conqueror, who, after having finished the race with the highest applause, demands the rewards of the *Olympic* palm.

By these tokens it is evident, how much the conscious power of the mind may comfort the hearts of mortals by hope, or torment them by fear; but

whence this fear, what means this hope, I would ask, if, indeed, nothing is to be hoped, nothing to be feared after death? Behold how all things indicate a future existence!

Wherefore, whether things fall out well or ill, here on earth, a wise man is neither over fond of life, nor fullenly hates it: for within, he has that with which he comforts himself under any hard lot; but if a more favourable gale should blow, he lives not unmindful, how inconstant, and how frail, are the good things of fortune; if any one can account those things to be good, which he fears to lose, or which (when he is in possession of them) he lightly esteems.

Nor fear lest hence the mind (more slothful) should decline to undergo labours,

bours, and risk dangers, if the public utility calls him to the duties of life: the contempt of these external things rather makes a man free and erect, and resolute, and unconquered in transacting affairs, and fortifies him against all accidents.

But you accuse this man, as one whom the hope of reward only, not the love of true virtue, not the moral sense, keeps in his duty; for his is a sordid virtue, who acts right only, that he may be rewarded, after death. He is truly good, whom, without any hope of the future, the sweet harmony of morals, and a simple rule of action, conducts to what is beautiful, and comely, above all things, and for its own sake. Be it so; neither is he a bad man, who does not stop here, but knows rightly

to direct his course to the goal, whither nature leads ; and is always carried by his inbred hopes, beyond mortal things, and continually seeks to approach the supreme good.

Tell me, then, I beseech you, what rewards, what kind of recompense, he hopes for himself ? for he does not pursue mean things ; it is not voracious usury, nor a crowd of followers, nor false applause, nor counterfeit glory, nor that ambition which spreads wicked lies among the incautious vulgar, that actuates him, or the empty splendor of titles.

But whither true honour, whither nature conducts, and the dignity of human kind commands to go, he will boldly go : and adding one virtue to another, as long as he is obliged to exercise him-

self

self in this school of life, will prepare his mind, by degrees, for a better destiny.

We, the rest of mankind, are carried, to and fro, like a vessel, as the tempest drives us; and by various ways, with great struggling, catch at a flying shadow. And as children seek toys with the most ardent application, which, being obtained, they soon relinquish again; so also we, when grown men, play the children. But he who is well persuaded that this life is not the last, and that another state remains, the matter to him is secure, nor is he fed by vain hopes; for when the restless mind of man seeks a good that is pure and simple, he cannot expect now to obtain such a happiness: and why? now we all live where evil is confounded
with

with good; where sorrow with joy;
 where wisdom herself, doting, hunts
 after trifles; and poisonous aconite
 blossoms even in gardens of roses.

Indeed all things are mixed, all in-
 constant, in short, all trifling, nor is
 there, any where, what answers to our
 desires. And, perhaps, God himself,
 (if it be lawful to search into the divine
 counsel) so attempers things, mingling
 always adverse with prosperous, and
 seasons the sweet with the bitter; that
 hence the mind may learn to despise
 terrestrial enjoyments, and being chas-
 tised by friendly evils, may place its
 hope in heaven alone, where is a sure
 dwelling, where is the only rest from
 labour.

Now therefore, at last, recollect with
 me the things which have been offered.

For

For like one who hath passed the dubious way, and escaped the rocks of error that lay concealed, and perillous seas, I now discover the port.

Well then, this mind, which thinks and wills, is not composed of earthly elements; therefore is something immortal, in its own nature. But yet even this, this God can destroy: Be it so; God can, if it be his divine pleasure; but he will not destroy it: for neither that capacity of knowing so many things, which are so remote from human condition; nor, moreover, that longing, never to be satisfied, after what is eternal; nor that desire, inherent in our minds, of what is perfect, is in vain. Now if justice and equity require that wickedness should be punished, and virtue rewarded,

rewarded; and if neither the one nor the other takes place while we live in this state; it remains that such discrimination be made in another. Then indeed the scene of things which now seems to be incomplete (if you take a view of mankind) and not worthy of a wise and good Deity, shall reveal itself without a cloud, and the true complection of things, and the true order shall be seen. Unless you believe this, say, by what arguments it can, at all, be proved, that there is a God, who governs all things with the highest wisdom, and harmony? What, does he fitly govern all other things, and fail in this part, which is the principal? Not so; the time will come (enquire not in what manner) this is enough, this is certain, there will be a time, after death, when God, as is fit, will

will separate the just from the unjust,
 the innocent from the guilty, and will
 dispense to each, that which he has de-
 served.

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